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CRIMINALIZATION AS A POLICY
RESPONSE TO A PUBLIC HEALTH
CRISIS
J.

KELLY STRADER*

No one can seriously question that American society now confronts crises it seems ill-prepared to meet. Urban violence and drug
addiction, for example, have created an atmosphere of despair
among much of the population. The HIV disease epidemic - and
related problems, including the dramatic increase in tuberculosis
cases - have led to despair among gay and bisexual men, intravenous drug users, hemophiliacs, and others who are at an increased
risk for exposure to the virus.
Nor could anyone seriously contend that any of these problems
can be effectively addressed without thoughtful, direct intervention
by federal, state, and local government. All of these crises, however, are enormously complex. In order for our policy-makers to
construct and implement effective policy responses, they must first
commit themselves to that goal. A principled commitment, along
with the intellectual effort required to formulate a response, often
require acts of political courage that many of our elected and appointed officials apparently are not yet willing to undertake.
When faced with the politically risky and intellectually challenging tasks of developing responses to our nation's crises, our policy-makers often opt for politically safe and intellectually easy
approaches. In an effort to wipe out violence, drug addiction, and
the HIV/AIDS epidemic, policy-makers have increased arrests and
prosecutions under existing laws, have created new crimes, and,
where the activity is already criminalized, have increased the
sentences. Thus, to combat violence, the United States Senate has
passed a bill that would create a myriad of new federal crimes.1 To
* Associate Professor, Southwestern University School of Law. B.A., College of William and Mary; M.I.A., Columbia University; J.D., University of Virginia. My thanks to Kyle S. Brodie, Southwestern University School of Law
Class of 1994, for his invaluable assistance, and to Duane J. Doggett for his
inspiration.
1. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, S. 1607, 139
CONG. REC. S16288 (Nov. 19, 1993). The trend towards federalization of crime
is contrary to the general principle that law enforcement falls within the constitutional province of state and local government. Courts have invalidated some
earlier attempts to federalize everyday crime as without jurisdictional basis.
See, e.g., United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) (holding
Congress lacked the power to enact the Anti-Car Theft Act of 1992).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 27:435

combat drug use, Congress and many state legislatures have imposed longer sentences and have reduced or eliminated sentencing
discretion. 2 It should come as no surprise, then, that the federal
government and many state authorities have likewise turned to the
criminal law to help limit the spread of HIV/AIDS.
Nearly half the states have adopted statutes, some of them
very broadly worded, making it a felony to knowingly engage in activity that might expose another to HIV. In a number of states
without such specific statutes, prosecutors have employed traditional criminal laws to prosecute those with HIV/AIDS. For example, in a recent Texas case, 3 an HIV-positive man who spit on a
prison guard was convicted of attempted murder and sentenced to
life in prison.
The laws that criminalize HIV exposure may be put to use in a
number of contexts, including health care. Under the literal terms
of a number of the HIV-specific laws, any HIV-positive health care
worker (HCW) who performs, or HIV-positive patient who submits
to, an invasive medical procedure is guilty of a crime.
Focusing on the use of criminal law as a weapon against HIV/
AIDS, this Article addresses two inter-related issues. First, how
will the use of criminal law to combat HIV/AIDS affect HCWs and
patients? Second, is the use of criminal sanctions an effective or
appropriate way to combat HIV/AIDS?
I.

AN OVERVIEW OF THE CRIMINAL LAW RESPONSE

Depending on the jurisdiction, a person with HIV/AIDS may be
prosecuted in situations described below, under traditional criminal
laws and/or HIV-specific criminal statutes. 4 Although, to date,
HCWs and their patients have not been the focus of these prosecutions, they could be liable under both traditional and HIV-specific
criminal statutes. In addition, the United States Congress has considered adopting an HIV-specific criminal statute directed at
HCWs. 5
2. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 authorized the United States Sentencing Commission to promulgate mandatory federal sentencing guidelines.
18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3580 (1991); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL (1993). The trend to reduce sentencing
discretion has been underway in the states for more than a decade. See U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE: THE DATA 71
(1983).
3. Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992).
4. See generally Michael L. Closen et al., Criminalizationof an Epidemic:
HIV-AIDS and Criminal Transmission Laws, 46 ARK. L. REV. 601 (1994).
5. The Helms Disclosure Proposal, H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991)
(amendment 734), was passed by the Senate 81 to 18. 137 CONG. REC. 510363
(July 18, 1991). The amendment was deleted from the final bill. H.R. REP. No.
234, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 37-38 (1991).
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A.

TraditionalCriminal Laws

In recent years, prosecutors have brought a number of cases
alleging that the defendant knowingly or purposefully exposed or,
in a few cases, transmitted HIV to another.6 Most of the cases have
been prosecuted as attempted murders or assaults. An attempted
murder prosecution is viable in cases where there is sufficient evidence for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant intended to transmit the virus. Many of these prosecutions
arose where the defendant was in custody and lashed out at corrections or police officers by actions such as spitting or biting. These
convictions have been sustained even in the absence of proof that
7
HIV has been transmitted by such actions.
Commentators have noted the practical difficulties in bringing
murder or attempted murder prosecutions for exposing or transmitting HIV to others. For a murder prosecution, in the rare case
where the defendant outlives the victim, the government may have
difficulty proving causation, i.e., that the victim's only exposure to
HIV resulted from the defendant's acts. With attempted murder,
the prosecution must prove that the defendant acted with the purpose to kill, an element supported by sufficient facts in only rare,
though often sensational, cases.8
Assault statutes can also be used for prosecuting HIV exposures and transmissions. These statutes punish people who cause
or attempt to cause bodily injury to others. 9 In some circumstances,
6. See, e.g., Brock v. State, 555 So. 2d 285 (Ala. Crim. App. 1989) (defendant, a prisoner with AIDS, charged with attempted murder for biting a corrections officer); State v. Haines, 545 N.E.2d 834 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (defendant
with AIDS convicted for attempted murder for spitting at police and
paramedics and splattering them with his blood after a suicide attempt); Zule v.
State, 802 S.W.2d 28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990) (defendant with AIDS convicted for
aggravated criminal sexual assault for infecting victim with HIV).
For examples of two recent cases, see Around the Nation, THE ADVOCATE,
Feb. 8, 1994, at 20 (discussing a Missouri case where a defendant who had
AIDS was found guilty of violating the state's HIV-exposure law and sentenced
to five years for biting a police officer, and a North Carolina case where a defendant who said he was HIV-positive was charged with assault with a deadly
weapon for throwing a blood-soaked towel on a police officer).
7. In assault and attempted murder prosecutions, the prosecution may not
be required to show that transmission was possible. See Haines, 545 N.E.2d at
839 (stating "[ilt was only necessary for the State to show that Haines did all
that he believed necessary to bring about an intended result, regardless of what
was actually possible"). Even where the prosecution must make such a showing, a remote possibility of transmission may suffice. See Weeks, 834 S.W.2d at
562 n.2 (affirming conviction for attempted murder for spitting despite testimony that it is impossible to transmit AIDS by spitting).
8. Thomas W. Tierney, Comment, Criminalizingthe Sexual Transmission
of HIV: An InternationalAnalysis, 15 HASTINGS INT'L. & CoMP. L. REV. 475, 493
(1992). See Haines, 545 N.E.2d at 834 (the defendant, stating his intention to
kill after a failed suicide attempt, was convicted of attempted murder for having
spat on, scratched, bitten, and thrown blood on corrections officers).
9. MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.2 (1980).
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the state can instead prosecute the defendant under a reckless endangerment statute.10
The traditional criminal laws that have substantial penalties,
such as murder and attempted murder, would apply to HCWs or
patients only in the most egregious circumstances. In the only
known instance of HCW-to-patient HIV transmission, five patients
of an HIV-infected Florida dentist apparently contracted HIV from
dental treatment.'1 The dentist died before the transmission was
discovered, and the means of transmission is not known.
Many have speculated, however, that the dentist may. have intentionally infected his patients out of anger or despair, or may
have been extremely reckless with regard to sterilization of instruments. Either state of mind could provide the basis for a murder
prosecution. An attempted murder charge requires proof that the
HCW acted with an intent to kill. If the patient died, the HCW
could be charged with murder based upon extreme recklessness,
manslaughter based upon ordinary recklessness, or negligent homicide. 12 In some circumstances, under traditional criminal laws, a
HCW could be charged with a felony for exposing a patient to HIV
or transmitting HIV to a patient.
B.

HIV-Specific Criminal Statutes

Nearly half of the states have adopted statutes criminalizing
activity that exposes others to HIV.' 3 A number of commentators
have noted that these statutes are largely the product of political
pressures on legislators to "do something" to combat the HIV/AIDS
epidemic. 14 Indeed, the Ryan White bill, passed by Congress in
1990 to combat HIV/AIDS, conditions the award of certain federal
assistance to states on each state's certification that it has criminalized HIV exposure. 15 In addition, the Report of the Presidential
Commission on the HIV Epidemic, issued in 1988, recommended
the adoption of HIV-specific criminal statutes.
In their broadest form, these HIV-specific statutes criminalize
any knowingly conducted activity that poses a risk of HIV trans10. Id.
11. Jeffery W. Cavender, Note, AIDS in the Health Care Setting: The Congressional Response to the Kimberly Bergalis Case, 26 GA. L. REv. 539, 540-41
(1992).
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9, § 2.02(2) (defining culpability);
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9, §§ 210.0-.4 (outlining model homicide
provisions).

13. Closen et al., supra note 4, at 940 n.73.
14. See Closen et al., supra note 4, at 923 n.8 (explaining that legislatures
pass HIV-specific statutes in an effort to reduce the public's fear).
15. Ryan White Comprehensive AIDS Resources Emergency Act of 1990,
Pub. L. No. 101-381, 104 Stat. 576 (1990).
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mission.1 6 Of course, such statutes on their face render potentially
criminal the performance of invasive procedures by an HIV-positive
HCW, or submission to an invasive procedure by an HIV-positive
patient.
These statutes raise a number of significant but unresolved issues applicable to HCWs and patients. For example, the statutes
generally require that the defendant act with the "knowledge" that
he or she is HIV-positive. "Knowledge," as a description of a criminal state of mind, encompasses willful blindness. As the Model Penal Code notes, "[w]hen knowledge of the existence of a particular
fact is an element of an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of its existence. ..."17 Under
this definition, a gay surgeon, or an intravenous drug-user patient,
could well be deemed to have constructive knowledge that he or she
is HIV-positive. 18 Such a person could then be criminally liable for
performing or submitting to an invasive medical procedure.
Moreover, it is not certain that a patient or HCW can consent
to undergo or perform the procedure even if the other party discloses his or her HIV status. Many of the criminal HIV transmission statutes do not allow consent as a defense. 19 In states with
broadly worded statutes, but no consent defense, all HIV-positive
patients,even those who disclose their HIV status, will be guilty of
a serious crime whenever they submit to medical care that poses
some risk of HIV transmission. Nor will the patient's consent be a
defense to an HIV-positive HCW who performs any20 procedure that
poses even a theoretical risk of HIV transmission.
The willful blindness and consent issues highlight what might
charitably be termed the carelessness with which HIV/AIDS has
been criminalized. Furthermore, the trend towards criminalization
is not likely to abate. Indeed, the United States Senate recently
adopted Senator Jesse Helm's proposal - a proposal later defeated
in House-Senate conference - to make it a crime for HCWs who
know they have HIV to perform invasive medical procedures with16. Illinois, for example, proscribes "intimate contact with another," defined
as the "exposure of the body of one person to a bodily fluid of another person in

a manner that could result in the transmission of HIV." 720 ILCS 5/12-16.2
(1991) (emphasis added). The Illinois Supreme Court has held the statute con-

stitutional. People v. Russell, No. 73721, 1994 WL 12502 (Ill. Jan. 20, 1994).
17. MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9, § 2.02(7).
18. See Cooper v. State, 539 So. 2d 508, 511 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989) (declaring that due to his lifestyle, the defendant knew or should have known he
was exposed to HIV, and that by sexual battery on his victim, there was a
strong likelihood that the victim would be exposed to HIV).
19. Closen et al., supra note 4, at 945 n.87.
20. Cf. Michael L. Closen, When a Doctor Has AIDS, NAT'L. L.J., Sept. 9,
1991, at 15 (arguing that a patient's knowing consent to submit to health care
procedures does not sufficiently protect the patient when the HCW has HIV).
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out advising patients of their HIV status. 2 1 Thus, the issue that
the public and their legislators must face is whether the proposed
and existing HIV-related criminal statutes effectively address the
public health issues raised by the HIV/AIDS epidemic.
II.

POSSIBLE RATIONALES FOR CRIMINALIZATION

If the HIV-specific statutes have been carelessly drafted, perhaps it is because the legislatures' policy goals in enacting these
statutes have been correspondingly unclear. In order to determine
whether criminalization of HIV/AIDS is an appropriate response to
the epidemic, it is necessary first to analyze possible goals of such
criminalization. Specifically, does criminalization meet either retributive or utilitarian goals for criminal punishment?
A.

Wrongdoers Deserve to be Punished

Retributive theories premise punishment upon the view that
the guilty party is morally culpable and therefore deserves to be
proportionately punished by society. 2 2 An HIV-positive person
who, without revealing his or her HIV status, has unsafe sex with
another person certainly is morally culpable.
However, many of the HIV-specific statutes go far beyond this
scenario. On their face, many of the statutes criminalize acts that
pose virtually no risk of transmission. 2 3 Further, many of the statutes do not provide a defense if the other party knowingly consents,
though it is debatable whether consent should be a defense to a
high-risk act.2 4 Nor do most of the statutes provide a defense for
the use of a condom. Without such defenses, an HIV-positive person is consigned to a sexless life. Engaging in non-risky sexual activities hardly warrants criminal penalties.
With high risk activities, acknowledgement that an HIV-positive person who knowingly engages in such activities is morally culpable does not inevitably lead to the conclusion that the criminal
punishment these statutes impose serves retributive goals. With
the HIV-specific statutes, and with many of the HIV-exposure prosecutions under traditional criminal laws, 25 it is impossible to avoid
21. H.R. 2622, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). See Cavender, supra note 11,
at 549.
22. See generally EDMUND L. PINCOFFS, PHILOSOPHY OF LAw: A BRIEF INTRO.
DUCTION 16-19 (1991) (discussing principles and origins of retributive theory).
23. See supra note 16 (discussing Illinois HIV transmission statute).
24. See Closen et al., supra note 4, at 946 (discussing consent as a defense).
Due to the nature of the harm, consent is not a defense to murder. Given the
potential degree of harm from HIV exposure, some make the argument that

consent likewise should not be a defense under the exposure statutes.
25. See, e.g., Weeks v. State, 834 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. Ct. App. 1992) (imposing
life sentence on HIV-positive defendant after attempted murder conviction for
spitting on a prison guard).
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the sense that "retribution" means something very different with
HIV than with other communicable diseases. The speed with which
the HIV-specific statutes have been enacted, and the fanfare with
which the HIV exposure cases have been brought, raises the question of whether the goal of these statutes is primarily to impose proportionate punishment for the criminal act. The statutes, to a
substantial degree, stigmatize an accused merely for having HIV
and correspondingly, in most cases, for being a member of a socially
marginalized group.
Other sexually transmitted diseases, such as syphilis, also created public health crises and produced legislative responses. 2 6 No
other communicable disease, however, has produced the wave of
criminalization that HIV has produced. It is useful to compare legislatures' earlier, more-restrained responses to outbreaks of communicable diseases. Beginning in the late nineteenth century,
state legislatures used their police powers to enact statutes in order
to protect the public health and safety. 27 These statutes provided
for physical examinations, vaccinations, and quarantines. Correspondingly, legislatures enacted statutes making it a misdemeanor
to knowingly expose others to syphilis and other specified communicable diseases. 28 These quasi-criminal statutes have seldom been
29
enforced.
Exposure to HIV/AIDS is, unquestionably, a terrifying prospect. For centuries, syphilis was also a horrific, life-threatening
disease. Syphilis remains a frightening disease, but does not invoke the horror it once did - a horror in some ways comparable to
that now produced by HIV/AIDS. Why, then, have a number of
states enacted HIV-specific criminal law statutes? The answer
must lie beyond retributive principles.
B. Net Benefit to Society
1.

General UtilitarianPrinciples

Most commentators agree that HIV criminalization is justified
more by utilitarian than by retributive principles. Utilitarian phi26. See Stephen V. Kenney, Comment, CriminalizingHIV Transmission:
Lessons from History and a Model for the Future, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 245, 249 (1992) (stating "[slyphilis and AIDS possess several commonalities: both have existed in epidemic proportions; each may be sexually transmitted and manifest after a long latency period; the two have severe pathological
consequences; and both have created fear and hysteria among the general public") (footnotes omitted).
27. See id. at 254 n.50 (discussing specific diseases these laws were
designed to address).
28. See id. at 255 n.60 (discussing the low level of severity of the punishments imposed for violating these early health laws).
29. Kathleen M. Sullivan & Martha A. Fields, AIDS and the Coercive Power
of the State, 23 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139, 170 (1988).
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losophy holds that punishment is only justified when the gain to
society outweighs the cost to the individual punished.3 0 This net
positive outcome may be accomplished in several ways. First, while
the person is imprisoned, the threat to society is removed by this
restraint. Second, the punishment may reform the punished party
so that he or she is unlikely to commit the criminal act again. Finally, the punishment itself may deter the individual, and others in
society, from engaging in the punishable acts. None of these potential justifications, however, provides a legitimate rationale for
broad criminalization of HIV.
It is doubtful that restraint is a legitimate purpose of HIV
criminalization. If the goal were truly to restrain those who engage
in risky conduct, quarantine under the public health laws would
seem to be a more direct approach. Felony convictions for persons
with HIV disease often amount to life sentences. Because these
persons are placed in environments where there is poor health care,
and where there is the risk of HIV transmission to other prisoners,
it is doubtful that such restraint produces a net benefit to society.
Nor is rehabilitation a legitimate goal of HIV criminalization.
As noted above, felony prosecutions will result in what are effectively life sentences for many with the HIV disease. For those who
are released, it is difficult to believe that criminal sanctions could
possibly have as significant an effect on sexual behavior or I.V. drug
use as much less costly solutions such as education and counseling.
The commentary on HIV criminalization makes it clear that
the primary goal is neither restraint nor rehabilitation, but deterrence. The commentators argue that those who are HIV-positive
will know that certain acts are criminalized, and will be deterred
from engaging in those acts. 3 1 Criminal prosecutions will thus
"prevent conduct likely to spread HIV in order to prevent transmis32
sion of HIV to uninfected persons."
Passage of HIV-specific criminal laws, and prosecutions under
traditional criminal laws, are therefore designed to serve an explicit
public health goal to stop the spread of HIV. Policy-makers see the
criminalization of HIV exposure as a medium for a message - by
deeming specified behavior as deserving of punishment, the spread
of HIV will be stemmed. Presumably, this goal applies equally to
HCWs and their patients; the statutes make no distinction.
30. See generally PINCOFFS, supra note 22, at 9-19 (discussing utilitarian
versus retributive criminal theory).
31. See, e.g., Larry Gostin, The Politics of AIDS: Compulsory State Powers,

Public Health, and Civil Liberties, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1017, 1038 (1989); Donald
H.J. Hermann, Criminalizing Conduct Related to HIV Transmission, 9 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 351, 352 (1990).

32. Hermann, supra note 31, at 352.

1994

Criminalizationas a Policy Response

The nature of the proscribed activities raises an immediate
question about the deterrence rationale. As with sodomy laws,
which prohibit private, consensual sexual acts, criminalization of
HIV exposure presupposes law enforcement's awareness of private
acts. In most circumstances, criminal charges for knowing HIV exposure, like charges under sodomy laws, are unlikely to be brought
due to the intimate, private nature of the crimes. Nor are prosecutors likely to have evidence that the accused had the requisite
knowledge or intent. 3 3 In the absence of prosecution, criminal law
can be expected to have little deterrent effect.
It is also unlikely that criminal law can deter human beings
from acting on their basic sexual desires. Certainly, this is the lesson of sodomy laws. 3 4 Statutes that criminalize virtually any sex-

ual activity by an HIV-positive person 35 will likely be broadly
ignored.
As also noted by many commentators, criminalization may actually have a boomerang effect. Both traditional and HIV-specific
criminal laws generally require that, at a minimum, the defendant
act with knowledge. Testing and early treatment are considered
critical in the response to HIV/AIDS. For those who would rather
not face the prospect of living with the knowledge that they carry
the virus, there is already a psychological disincentive with respect
to testing; criminalization provides yet another reason not to be
tested.

36

It is possible, however, that a carefully drafted criminal statute
could affect behavior in a constructive way. A statute that
criminalized only specified, risky activities where protective measures such as condoms were not used, and where the other party had
37
not provided informed consent, could produce the desired result.

33. See Gene Schultz, AIDS: Public Health and the Criminal Law, 7 ST.
Louis U. PuB. L. REV. 65, 110 n. 212 (1988) (noting the problem in the availability

of medical records as evidence of knowledge).

34. See J. Kelly Strader, ConstitutionalChallenges to the Criminalizationof
Same-Sex Sexual Activities: State Interest in HIV-AIDS Issues, 70 DEN. L. REV.
337, 354 & n.37 (1993) (discussing the ineffectiveness of sodomy laws).
35. See, e.g., 720 ILCS 5/12-16.2 (1992) ("intimate contact"); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1993) (sexual contact); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.5210 (1992) (sexual penetration - "emission of semen not required"); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 191.677 (Supp. 1992) ("create a grave and unjustifiable risk ...
through sexual or other contact"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441A.180 (Michie

1992) ("any manner likely to expose others").
36. If a person is found to be willfully blind to his or her HIV-positive status, however, that person could be liable even in the absence of actual knowledge. See MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 9, § 2.02(7).
37. Without the consent defense, the statutes send a clear message that the
proscribed sexual activities are unworthy of any protection. See Michael L.
Closen, Mandatory Disclosure of HIV Blood Test Results to the Individuals
Tested: A Matter of PersonalChoice Neglected, 22 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 454-55
(1991); Closen et al., supra note 4, at 947-48 (Professor Schultz argues that,

because society permits other dangerous activities ranging from elective sur-
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UtilitarianGoals in the Health Care Context

In the health care context, the deterrence issue becomes much
more complex. Medical procedures are not private in the same
sense that consensual sex acts in the home are private. State authorities would not have to investigate extensively to learn the
types of procedures being performed by a HCW whom the authorities believed to be HIV-positive.
As discussed above, some of the HIV-specific statutes encompass any act that carries any possibility of HIV transmission. The
statutes require that an accused person prove a negative proposition: that it was not possible to transmit HIV in a particular case.
Given the uncertain state of medical knowledge, and the availability of experts who will testify for the government that transmission
is possible in a wide range of circumstances, this is a nearly impossible task.
Thus, any invasive procedure, ranging from major surgery to
routine gynecological or prostate examinations, or examinations of
the ears, nose or throat, could be found to violate a broadly worded
HIV-specific statute. 38 Therefore, assuming consent is not a defense to a criminal charge of HIV exposure, every invasive act could
constitute a serious crime under these statutes. Likewise, in the
absence of a consent defense, an HIV-positive patient would be unable to submit to treatment without risking criminal prosecution.
A person with HIV/AIDS would therefore risk prosecution for seeking medical care, a result that hardly supports the public health
39
goal of limiting the impact of HIV in the health care setting.
HCWs and patients have rarely, if ever, been prosecuted under
the HIV-specific statutes or under traditional criminal laws for exposing or transmitting HIV to another. Yet, it would be easier for
prosecutors to locate potential offenders in the health care context
gery to violent sports, criminalizing knowing, consensual sexual activities devalues that activity). For an argument why consent should perhaps not be a
defense for knowing HIV exposure, see Closen et al., supra note 4, at 944 n.86.
38. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN., § 5-14-123(c) (Michie 1992) (defining sexual
penetration to include "any other intrusion, however slight, of any part of a
person's body or of any object into the genital or anal openings of another person's body"); 720 ILCS 5/12-16.2 (1992) ("intimate contact"); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 14:43.5 (West Supp. 1993) (sexual contact); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 333.5210 (1992) (sexual penetration - "emission of semen not required"); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 191.677 (Supp. 1992) ("create a grave and unjustifiable risk...
through sexual or other contact"); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 441A.180 (Michie

1992) ("any manner likely to expose others").
39. Health care workers have a duty to treat those with HIV, and to use
precautions when doing so. See generally Mary Anne Bobinski, Risk and Ra-

tionality: The Centers for Disease Control and the Regulation of H1V-Infected
Health Care Workers, 36 ST. Louis U. L.J. 213 (1992) (discussing legal issues
surrounding the center for the CDC's guidelines on HCWs and HIV). Therefore, it is not clear that a consent defense in this context would provide significant additional protection.
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because the provision and receipt of health care are not private in
the sense that consensual sexual activities are private. Presumably, therefore, prosecutors have exercised their discretion not to invoke the full powers of the criminal law in this context. The
absence of prosecution means that even though HCWs and patients
face a risk of being criminally charged, that risk in practice is too
insubstantial to deter the proscribed acts.
In the health care context, then, the deterrence/health care rationale for criminalizing HIV exposure is even more dubious than is
vis-a-vis the general public. Further, HCWs and patients face the
possibility of civil liability if they fail to disclose their HIV-positive
status prior to an invasive procedure. 40 This prospect is likely to be
a more significant deterrent than a merely theoretical possibility of
criminal prosecution.
There are other, more compelling reasons why the threat of
criminal punishment is inappropriate for HCWs. The Federal
Center for Disease Control's guidelines require HCWs who perform
invasive procedures to be tested for HIV. If these HCWs test HIVpositive, the guidelines forbid them to perform certain procedures
without permission from a review panel. 4 1 These guidelines seem
to be a far more direct and effective way to reduce the risk of exposing patients to HIV. Criminalization is at best an ineffective means
of reducing the spread of HIV. This conclusion applies both to the
general population and to HCWs and their patients.
III.

THE MESSAGE IN

HIV/AIDS

CRIMINALIZATION

It is clear that HIVIAIDS has been criminalized in an unprecedented fashion. The broadest HIV-transmission statutes criminalize virtually any sexual activities for those carrying the virus. The
statutes are so broad that they encompass the provision of health
care services and the receipt of health care treatment by those with
HIV in a wide range of circumstances.
Despite the foregoing, many would argue that enacting HIVspecific criminal statutes, and prosecuting under those statutes and
traditional criminal laws, nonetheless sends an important message
to all those with HIV, including HCWs and patients: When those
persons engage in acts that could transmit the virus, they are acting in contravention of the moral force of criminal law. Therefore,
those who know, or should know, they have HIV and who engage in
proscribed acts are subject to criminal sanction.
As criminal law commentators have long noted, society's power
over individuals is nowhere more intrusive, nor its moral condem40. See Closen et al., supra note 4, at 952 n.111 (noting recent suits brought
against HCWs and patients infected with HIV).
41. See Bobinski, supra note 39, at 226-29 (discussing CDC guidelines).
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nation more profound, than when society stigmatizes and punishes
individuals as criminals. Therefore, even if the criminal law is not
often enforced in the HIV context, it sends a message and is justified solely on that basis.
This is the same argument that advocates of sodomy laws invoke. These laws are rarely enforced, and it is doubtful that laws
can deter sex in any event. The proponents of those laws argue,
however, that even though sodomy laws cannot provide effective deterrence, they do provide an important message to the effect that
those who commit sodomy are deserving of society's zMoral
42
condemnation.
People with HIV/AIDS are likewise subject to condemnation.
Gay and bisexual men, prostitutes, and I.V. drug users - the
groups generally perceived to be at risk of HIV-infection 43 - are
not popular groups. When associated with a disease that most perceive as inevitably fatal, these groups become worthy of condemnation essentially for being who they are.
The criminal law is designed to protect society from harm and
to ensure justice. When the law ceases to play that role, but instead
becomes a vehicle for society's most basic prejudices, something is
amiss. As Professor Kadish has written, this approach "corrupts
both citizenry and police and reduces the moral authority of the
criminal law, especially among those portions of the citizenry - the
poor and subcultural - who are particularly likely to be treated in
44
an arbitrary fashion."
That is not to say that criminal sanctions should never be imposed when a person knowingly engages in behavior that carries a
substantial risk of exposing another to HIV. A carefully drafted
statute, clearly defining risky acts and providing the defenses of
consent and use of a condom, could be a fair and direct way of addressing the issue. But carefully defining sex acts and applicable
defenses requires a legislature to acknowledge that people should
be able to engage in same-sex sexual activities except in limited circumstances. It is far easier for legislatures to forbid undefined
risky activities and to omit discussion of defenses than to craft such
a statute.
The general HIV exposure statutes, and broad application of
traditional criminal laws, thus sweep so broadly that they encompass activity that carries no real risk of HIV transmission. Instead,
the laws provide broad condemnation of large groups of society. In
the process, criminalization also taints acts that promote the public
42. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 195-96 (1986) (finding justification
for sodomy laws in the state's interest in regulating morality).
43. Closen et al., supra note 4, at 924 n.10.
44. SANFoRD H.
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health goal of treating HIV - providing health care to those with
HIV.
What is needed, then, is more thought and less reaction. The
HIV/AIDS epidemic can be contained by more effective and less
costly means than enacting and enforcing new criminal statutes.
Education and counselling, beginning with schools and directed
both to the general public and to at-risk communities, are surely a
more effective use of public resources. Although politically difficult,
a serious response to the disease demands more than a misuse of
the criminal law.
Cri ihalization, in this context and others, sometimes indicates an unwillingness to tackle issues directly. Through criminalization, legislatures and prosecutors are sending a message not
primarily based upon the legitimate criminal law goals of retribution and deterrence. Instead, the message seems designed both to
convince voters that government is attacking this issue, and to
deem those who carry the virus to be worthy of condemnation for
having the disease. Such an approach, which strays from the basic
criminal law goals of protecting society and ensuring justice, undermines the legitimacy of the criminal law itself. Finally, such an
approach does not serve the goals of preventing the spread of HIV
and treating those infected with the disease. Our elected representatives should be expected to do better.

